The amount of reserves held by the U.S. banking system rose from under $50 billion in mid-2008 to over $1.5 trillion by mid-2011. Some economists argue that such a large quantity of bank reserves could lead to overly expansive bank lending as the economy recovers, regardless of the Federal Reserve's interest rate policy. In contrast, we show that the size of bank reserves has no effect on bank lending in a frictionless model of the current banking system, in which interest is paid on reserves and there are no binding reserve requirements. We also examine the potential for balance sheet cost frictions to distort banks' lending decisions. We find that large reserve balances do not lead to excessive bank credit and may instead be contractionary.
Introduction
The amount of reserves held by the U.S. banking system rose from under $50 billion in mid-2008 to over $1.5 trillion in mid-2011. These results are important because several economists and …nancial market participants claim that large levels of bank reserves will lead to overly expansive bank lending. 2 Despite such concerns, little formal analysis has been conducted to show such an e¤ect under the current banking system. In contrast, other commentators on the economy claim that the large level of reserves held in the banking system is evidence of a lack of bank lending.
In this note, we present a basic model of the current U.S. banking system, in which interest is paid on bank reserves and there are no binding reserve requirements.
We …nd that, absent any frictions, lending is una¤ected by the amount of reserves in the banking system. The key determinant of bank lending is the di¤erence between the return on loans and the opportunity cost of making a loan. We show that this di¤erence does not depend on the quantity of reserves. Moreover, when we introduce frictions, in the form of a cost related to the size of a bank's balance sheet cost, increases in reserves may actually reduce bank lending and lead to a decrease in prices.
The current banking system in the United States and worldwide no longer resembles the traditional textbook model of fractional reserve banking. Historically, the quantity of reserves supplied by a central bank determines the amount of bank loans. Through the "money multiplier," banks expand loans to equal the amount of reserves divided by the reserve requirement. However, in many countries, reserve requirements have been reduced either to zero, or to such small levels that they are no longer binding. 3 Starting in the late 1980s, the Federal Reserve supplied the quantity of reserves needed to maintain its policy target-the federal funds rate-which is the interest rate at which banks lend reserves to each other in the interbank market. The Federal
Reserve did not target the amount of reserves, the quantity of deposits or loans on banks'balance sheets, or broad measures of the money supply. In that regime, the federal funds rate represents a bank's alternative return on assets and hence is the required marginal return on bank lending. Banks expand their balance sheets so long as the marginal cost of funding is less than the marginal return on bank lending, abstracting from credit and liquidity risk. The federal funds rate sets the level of the required marginal return. [ Figure 1 . Large quantity of reserves in the banking system] reserves were $71 billion, just 0.6 percent of total bank assets, and vault cash satis…ed $43 billion of these requirements. 4 For details and analysis, see Ennis and Keister (2008) We introduce a new framework in which the role of …at reserves that pay interest can be studied in a general equilibrium banking economy with a closed system of bank payments and central bank reserves. We include banking, corporate, and retail sectors, which transact in competitive markets for bonds, deposits, loans and goods. We …rst create a benchmark model that shows without frictions, bank lending quantities and interest rates are invariant to the level of reserves chosen by the central bank. Banks lend up to the point where the marginal return on loans equals the return on holding reserves, which is equal to the interest rate on reserves set by the central bank. This provides an indi¤erence result for the quantity of reserves. In particular, while the size of banks'balance sheets expand with increases in reserves, all else equal, the lending decision for a bank is determined by the same marginal return condition as with the former method of monetary policy implementation.
A loan is made at the margin if its return exceeds the marginal opportunity cost of reserves, whether that is the federal funds rate as with the prior regime, or the rate of interest on reserves as in the current regime. We also demonstrate that the quantity of reserves held in the banking system in the absence of binding reserve requirements or signi…cant currency withdrawals is determined in the U.S. solely by the Federal Reserve. Aggregate bank reserves are independent of and provide no measure of the availability of bank credit or banks'willingness to lend.
We also study costs related to the size of a bank's balance sheet to examine whether the level of reserves a¤ects bank lending under this friction. The concern that banks may face balance sheet costs has been raised by market observers. 5 Banks may have costs that are increasing in the size of their balance sheets because of agency costs or regulatory requirements for capital or leverage ratios. During the recent crisis, banks worked to reduce the size of their balance sheets and were slow to raise equity capital, suggesting an increase in balance sheet costs. The analysis shows that, with these increasing costs, large quantities of reserves may, surprisingly, have a contractionary e¤ect on bank lending. Large balance sheet costs create a wedge between bank returns paid on deposits from returns received on assets.
When returns paid on deposits cannot fall enough in the face of increasing balance sheet costs because of a lower bound, increases in reserves can partially crowd out lending.
The paper proceeds with the model presented in Section 2. Section 3 gives results for the benchmark case with no frictions and the cases with balance sheet costs. Section 4 concludes. Formal statements of each proposition and proofs are contained in the Appendix.
Model
We consider a competitive economy with household, …rm, and banking sectors, a central bank, and a government. At date 0, the government issues bonds (B) that can be held by households (B H ), banks (B B ), or the central bank (B CB ):
Banks o¤er deposits (D) to households and provide loans to …rms. Households have an endowment (E) that can be held in deposits (D), government bonds (B H ), or storage of goods (S),
where goods have an implicit normalized price level of one at date 0. The central bank purchases bonds with an inelastic demand by issuing reserves (M ),
and only banks can hold these reserves.
At date 1, …rms produce output with a marginal real return r(L) on a volume of loans (L). Firms sell their output to households at the date 1 price level of goods.
This price is equal to in ‡ation ( ), i.e. the relative price of goods between dates 0 and 1; because the date 0 price level is normalized to one. We de…ne …rms'marginal nominal return on the production and sale of their output as
Note that we use uppercase letters to denote nominal amounts and lowercase letters to denote real amounts throughout the paper.
Firms pay a return (R L ) on loans, banks pay a return (R D ) on deposits, the government pays a return (R B ) on bonds, and the central bank pays a return (R M ) on reserves. The government, central bank, banks, …rms, and households are price takers in all markets, which include the markets for bonds, deposits, loans, and goods. For simplicity, we abstract from credit risk, liquidity risk, and risk aversion. 6 Next, we can write the optimization problems faced by …rms, households, and banks. For simplicity, we model each of these sectors as a representative entity.
A …rm chooses loans, sells output for revenue ( R L R(L)dL), and repays loans at a
A household chooses how many deposits and bonds to hold, which after paying a lump sum tax (T ) is used to purchase goods. Households keep any remaining endowment in storage, in order to maximize real consumption given as
Substituting for deposits (D = E B H S) from the household's budget constraint, 6 During the …nancial crisis up through September 2008, there was less that $100 billion in reserves in the banking system. At several points, banks appear to have had a demand for reserves for precautionary reasons that may have impacted interest rate spreads for liquidity reasons (see Ashcraft, McAndrews and Skeie, 2011) . However, the focus in the current paper is for the time period starting in late 2009 and beyond, when reserves ranged in the several hundreds of billions of dollars. This level was determined by the Federal Reserve supply for the purchase of assets rather than by bank demand. The ample supply of reserves has easily satis…ed any potential liquidity demand for reserves. For analysis of banking fragility in related nominal contracting frameworks, see Allen, Carletti and Gale (2011), Diamond and Rajan (2006) , Martin (2006) , and Skeie (2004 Skeie ( , 2008 ; and for studies of central bank interest rate policy within these frameworks see see Diamond and Rajan (2009) equation (2) , the problem can be written as
A bank receives deposits and must choose how many loans to …nance (L), as well as how many reserves (M ) and how many bonds (B B ) to hold, in order to maximize pro…ts. The bank's problem is
where c(D) is the marginal real cost associated with the size, D, of the bank's balance sheet, and C(D) is the marginal nominal balance sheet cost de…ned as
The bank's balance sheet requires that
so we can write
The date 0 budget constraints for households, banks and the central bank, given by equations (2), (8) , and (3), respectively, together imply household endowment is divided among loans, storage, and government bonds,
For a given amount of government bonds, B; maximum lending occurs when there is no storage, which we denote by
L E B:
We take as exogenous the government's choice of the quantity of bonds,
6 and the central bank's choice of the quantity of reserves and return on reserves,
respectively. The central bank remits its net revenue (R B B CB R M M ) to the government, and the government sets the lump sum tax (T ) to repay its debt:
We make the following assumptions on exogenous parameters and functions:
Assumption (A1) states that the …rm's technology is more productive than storage, along with standard Inada conditions. Assumption (A2) considers, for simplicity, monetary and …scal policy parameters that are within the feasible limit of the economy. Assumption (A3) states that when balance sheet costs are positive, these costs are increasing in the size of the balance sheet.
; we de…ne an equilibrium as prices R > 0 and quantities Q > 0 such that markets clear at Q
given individual optimizations at R.
In an interior solution, the …rst-order conditions for the …rm, household, and bank would be:
Since households can invest in both government bonds and deposits, they must have the same return for any interior solution. In such cases, we write
Since M and L are strictly positive, …rms borrow loans to the point that their …rst
The marginal loan …nanced by banks has a return equal to the return paid on reserves,
3 Results
Benchmark case
We …rst consider the benchmark case with no balance sheet costs, c(D) = 0: The return on the marginal loan, r(L); and hence the quantity of loans …nanced, L; is independent of the quantity of reserves, M: This provides our …rst basic result. The marginal rate of return on loans is endogenous, depending on the real marginal return of the production function of the …rm, the endogenous amount of loans, and the endogenous price at which the …rm sells goods, giving an endogenous nominal marginal rate of return on loans the …rm pays to the bank.
[ In Figure 2 , with minimal reserves, equilibrium loans are equal to nearly the full quantity of deposits. In Figure 3 , with a moderate level of reserves, loans no longer comprise the near entirety of banks'assets. Instead, the size of banks'balance sheets increase to fund both their loans to …rms and the reserves issued by the central bank. 
Balance-sheet costs
Next, we consider the case of positive bank balance sheet costs. This is an important and natural friction to consider since market participants raised concern that banks' balance sheets may be too large (Wrightson ICAP, 2008 and . Bank balance sheet costs may incorporate the costs of capital requirements and the shadow cost of potentially binding capital ratios. Instead, banks reduce the return on deposits:
The banks'return on the marginal loan, R L ; is not equal to banks'marginal funding costs, R D ; but rather is equal to the return on alternative assets, R M ; that banks can invest in: namely, reserves.
Proposition 2 For moderate balance sheet costs, c(D); and reserve levels ( M ), the marginal return (R L ) of lending by banks equals the return on reserves ( R M ).
These returns are greater than the return on deposits and bonds, which are equated
, and which in turn remain above in ‡ation ( ). The amount of bank sector lending (L) is independent of the amount of reserves ( M ).
The households'supply of deposits and banks'demand for deposits is endogenous, and hence the size of the banks'balance sheet is endogenous. The government bond rate and deposit rate are both determined in equilibrium according to the households …rst order conditions. Because the households always hold bonds and deposits in equilibrium, the two rates must be equal to make the household indifferent in holding the two assets. When there are positive balance sheet costs, the deposit rate falls below the bank's return on its assets (the interest on reserves rate which equals the loan rate) in order for the bank to be willing to hold a marginal deposit and a marginal asset. Thus the government bond rate falls below the banks' other asset rates, and banks prefer then to hold reserves and loans but zero bonds.
[ Figure 4 . Moderate level of reserves and moderate balance sheet costs]
The invariance result of moderate balance sheet costs and reserves on bank lending is illustrated in Figure 4 . The equilibrium returns on deposits and government bonds are equal and below the return on reserves:
The decrease in the return on deposits absorbs the balance sheet cost. Bank do not incur the balance sheet cost in their borrowing rates and do not pass the cost on through higher lending rates. Households receive the surplus from the banking sector at the margin. Households are willing to absorb the balance sheet costs as long as they receive a marginal real return by depositing at the bank, R D ; that is greater than the return on storage of one. In contrast, banks are operating at a competitive zero pro…t condition and are not willing to absorb losses at the margin. Households' demand for bonds becomes downward sloping along the region corresponding to positive balance sheet costs as increasing deposits imply a decreasing deposit return o¤ered by banks, which also decreases households'reservation rate for bonds. The bond return equates with the deposit return in equilibrium. However, as long as the return on deposits remains above in ‡ation, the real return on deposits is greater than the return on storage, which is one. Households will continue to have an inelastic supply of deposits equal to their endowment that is not held in bonds: The quantity of bank lending is unchanged from the benchmark case of zero balance sheet costs.
Finally, for large enough reserves and balance sheet costs, the deposit return falls to such a low level that it cannot fully absorb the costs. This occurs when the deposit return, as given by R D = R(L) C(D); falls to the lower bound given by the households'option to store goods instead of hold deposits. At this point, according
to the households'…rst order condition (13) , the real return on deposits is equal to that of storage, R D = 1: Together, these constraints imply that bank lending will be held down to a level such that the net marginal real rate of return on lending equals the marginal real bank balance sheet cost:
Lending in the economy can increase to the point that marginal real productivity of 
Discussion
We can discuss several potential extensions that lie outside the formal model, including the e¤ect of macroeconomic shocks on bank lending; bank heterogeneity;
and historical regimes for reserves.
To start, we examine how shifts in parameters can e¤ect bank lending. First, we consider an increase in loan demand driven by a productivity shock. We compare the e¤ect of an increase in the marginal return on …rms' investment up tor( ) > r( ) when there are minimal versus large reserves and balance sheet costs. With minimal reserves, an increase in productivity leads to a decrease in in ‡ation since
The marginal nominal return of bank lending is unchanged and there is no change in lending.
With large reserves and balance sheet costs, an increase in real productivity tor( ) > r( ); for a given level of loans L; increases the left-hand side of equation (17) . There is an increase in equilibrium loans toL; which moderates the equilibrium Next, we consider an increase in loan demand that is driven by an increase in households'demand. We examine the e¤ect of an increase in household endowment up toẼ > E; when there is a low or a moderate size of reserves and balance sheet costs. The increase in endowment leads to an increase in households'demand for deposits and an increase in in ‡ation, which shifts out …rms'demand for loans, lowering the …rms'real return on investment. The increase in equilibrium deposits, 14 loans, and in ‡ation is given by
The model allows for an instantaneous adjustment of deposits and loans regardless of the level of bank reserves. However, a lower velocity of money is required for a banking system with a higher level of reserves than one with a lower level of reserves. The banking sector lends the quantity of reserves it holds, M; to …rms that buy goods from households, who deposit the reserves in the banking system. The In past regimes that did not pay interest on reserves, reserve requirements were considered to impose a "tax" on banks. This tax is the return that banks had to forego by holding required reserves that paid no return, equal to DR(L): In comparison, under a policy of interest on reserves, banks no longer face the tax on required reserves. However, with a large quantity of reserves in the banking system, banks face the potential additional balance sheet costs from large levels of reserves,
Relative to the implicit tax on the modest level of required reserves that did not receive interest in past regimes, the balance sheet costs from reserves that are paid interest in the current regime would be smaller in times of low levels of reserves but would likely be much greater in times of large levels of reserves.
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Perhaps because of its novelty, the large quantity of reserves in the banking system has generated a great amount of concern and debate. However, there is little analysis of how reserves impact bank lending when interest is paid on reserves. This paper presents a model of the current U.S. banking system that includes interest on reserves and no binding reserve requirements. The exercise is important because of expressed concerns that large reserves could lead to excessive lending by banks, despite little formal analysis of the issue.
We develop a complete yet parsimonious framework by fully specifying a general equilibrium economy with several competitive sectors and a closed system of reserves and payments within the banking system. We study households'supply of deposits, demand for bonds, and consumption goods; …rms'demand for loans and supply of consumption goods; and banks' supply of loans and demand for deposits, bonds, and reserves. While we consider a representative competitive price-taking bank, it would be interesting in future research to eventually consider banks that are not fully price-taking, such as banks that may have some monopoly power on deposits and loans.
We show that without frictions, the amount of lending is independent of the amount of reserves in the banking system. We also demonstrate that the quantity of reserves is determined by the Federal Reserve and does not provide any measure of the willingness of banks to lend. We have kept our model simple and elementary in order to illustrate that the key determinant of bank lending is not fundamentally a¤ected by the quantity of reserves. This point has been obscured by the traditional textbook model of the money multiplier, which, while simple, is not an elementary model. Rather, that model assumes that a particular constraint-namely, the money multiplier-is always binding.
Our conclusion is likely to hold in more sophisticated models. While we cannot exclude the possibility that a more complicated model would overturn this result, economists concerned that large reserves will generate excessive lending should ar-17 ticulate precisely which frictions in a banking model will necessarily lead to this result. In contrast to such concerns, we study a friction under which the quantity of reserves could crowd out bank lending and lead to a decrease in in ‡ation. Banks may have increasing costs in the size of their balance sheets because of agency costs or regulatory requirements on capital or leverage. Under such a friction, the e¤ect of large reserves is contractionary rather than expansionary.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. We will show that if c(D) = 0, then there exists an
which is unique up to the allocation of bonds between households and …rms.
In any equilibrium, we must have (1), (2), and (3), and the central bank choice of reserves and their return requires that R M = R M and M = M . We …rst show that there does exist an equilibrium with
We have banks indi¤erent between holding bonds, reserves, and loans, and households indi¤erent between holding deposits and
Clearly these quantities satisfy individual optimizations at the given prices, are non-negative given (A2), and clear the market. Thus, this is an equilibrium at
To show uniqueness we argue that 
Since we always must have
directly implies that S = 0; which in turn implies that L = L since households must expend their entire endowment. In sum, we have that any potential equilibrium 
Because of (A3), (11) , and (14) we must have
and (A2) requires M > 0 in equilibrium, thus we must have
Once again, market clearing in the bond market then requires that
In sum, we have that
. Now, we show that there is an equilibrium with L = L: We …rst …nd an
, consumption of L must be optimal for both banks and …rms. As (A3) guarantees that L > 0, we have that > 0: Thus,
we have an equilibrium where
. To see that this is unique, consider a potential
implies that banks will not hold bonds and households need to expend all of their endowment. S > 0 implies that 
Such an L exists and is greater than
This L is optimally demanded by by both banks and …rms when
To see that Q is a unique quantity vector,
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it su¢ ces to show that L is the only potential equilibrium loan quantity, for then market clearing would imply all other quantities would have to equate with Q.
to be optimal for both banks and …rms, so L 0 > L cannot be an equilibrium. L 0 < L implies that < R D for L 0 to be optimal for both …rms and banks. But this would imply that S = 0, and L 0 would not clear the market since L 0 < L < L. So L 0 cannot be an equilibrium loan quantity, and the only potential equilibrium loan quantity is L.
Through implicit di¤erentiation, we have
Similarly A) Bond market: With moderate reserves and balance sheet costs, the households bond demand curve, 2 , , becomes downward sloping for implied deposit quantities corresponding to regions where banks have positive balance sheet costs. This is to reflect that the equilibrium deposit return decreases as the deposit supply curve shifts outward in the deposit market. As a result, an increase in the reserve level to 2 decreases the equilibrium bond return. Once again bond holdings fall to 2 , by the exact amount of the increase in reserves , 2 − 1 . B) Deposit market: The decrease in bond holdings is accompanied by an increase in the deposit supply to 2 . The deposit return decreases to compensate banks for their growing balance sheet costs along this region. Households willingly hold positive deposits as long as the deposit return is above that of the price level. C) Loan market: Loans once again remain unchanged because deposits increase by the exact amount of the increase in reserves. Banks' balance sheets grow again but the increase is entirely because of the increase in reserves. A) Bond market: With excessive balance sheet costs, bond and deposit returns equate to gross inflation, and storage becomes positive taking up part of the household's assets. The bond demand curve shifts downward to reflect the decreasing price level. B) Deposit market: The deposit demand curve shifts upward to with decreasing inflation until the deposit rate and inflation are also equated. C) Loan market: Equilibrium loans decrease to 3 as the decrease in inflation shifts loan demand leftward. Thus, deposits increase by strictly less than the increase in reserves. 
